Two Faces of Corporate Lobbying: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry
Document Type
Article - Merrimack Access Only
Publication Title
The North American Journal of Economics and Finance
Publication Date
10-2018
Abstract/ Summary
In this study, we examine how political connections increase firms’ innovation performance. By examining firm-level lobbying activities, we find that political connections lead to a greater number of medical breakthroughs among pharmaceutical firms in our sample. We then examine the underlying ways that political connections enhance innovation among medical firms. Using hand-collected data on government subsidies, we find that politically connected firms have a higher chance of receiving subsidies from federal, state, or local government agencies. These government subsidies enhance medical innovation by insulating managers from short-term threats and mitigate their career concerns by creating a “failure tolerant” environment. Overall, we show that connections between firms and politicians come with increased innovation outcomes.
Repository Citation
Unsal, O., North American Journal of Economics and Finance, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2018.10.006
