Document Type
Article - Open Access
Publication Title
Financial Management Association Annual Conference
Publication Date
10-2016
Abstract/ Summary
This paper addresses two side effects of corporate lobbying on firm value in the pharmaceutical industry. Employing corporate lobbying and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval data for the period from 1998 to 2013, we find that lobbying firms have a 67.3 percent higher chance that their new prescription drugs are approved by the FDA than non-lobbying firms. On the 3-day window surrounding FDA approval announcements, lobbying firms yield, on average, a 1.1% higher market reaction than non-lobbying peers. However, we also find that insiders in lobbying firms abnormally purchase their own stocks prior to FDA approvals. These opportunistic purchases substantially increase a firm’s litigation risk. Our evidence highlights the ambivalence of lobbying. While lobbying enhances firm value, it also offers an opportunity for insiders to trade their shares first by exploiting private information that eventually hurts firm value.
Repository Citation
Kim, D.,
Kim, I.,
&
Unsal, O.
(2016). Two Faces of Corporate Lobbying: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry. Financial Management Association Annual Conference
Available at: https://scholarworks.merrimack.edu/fin_facpub/4
